Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. by QUIGLEY, RODGER
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 61 
Issue 1 Storming the Court Article 7 
January 2017 
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. 
RODGER QUIGLEY 
New York Law School, 2017 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
RODGER QUIGLEY, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 61 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (2016-2017). 
This Case Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
159
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 61 | 2016/17
VOLUME 61 | 2016/17
RODGER QUIGLEY
Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc.
61 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 159 (2016–2017)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Rodger Quigley is the Editor in Chief of the 2016–2017 New York Law School 
Law Review, J.D. candidate, 2017.
www.nylslawreview.com
160
GLATT v. FOX SEARCHLIGHT PICTURES, INC.
 Unpaid internships are a significant and widespread feature of the contemporary 
economy.1 Substantial increases in the number of internships during the 1990s 
enticed job seekers with the promise of opportunity.2 The new “intern economy” 
resulted in a widespread restructuring of the labor market.3 Scant job prospects 
during the subsequent Great Recession further spurred the ubiquity of unpaid 
internships.4 Unpaid interns often felt aggrieved for not receiving compensation 
despite performing essential tasks in their positions,5 and turned to litigation as a 
means to seek justice.
 This development brought into the spotlight questions about the legality of 
employers using unpaid interns to do the work of actual employees. In the aftermath 
of the Great Recession, legal claims of unpaid interns and subsequent judicial 
holdings that addressed various ways to classify unpaid interns caused debate in the 
legal arena about a proper method of classification.6 One study from April 2014 
showed that since September 2011, former interns filed over thirty high-profile 
lawsuits across the country, arguing that they were entitled to compensation as 
“employees” under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).7 The Department of 
1. See Ross Perlin, Intern Nation: How to Earn Nothing and Learn Little in the Brave New 
Economy, at xvii (paperback ed. 2012).
2. See Lori K. Miller et al., The Internship Agreement: Recommendations and Realities, 12 J. Legal Aspects 
Sport 37, 37 (2002) (noting a seventy-three per cent increase for student internships completed in the 
1990s versus the 1980s).
3. See Jim Frederick, Internment Camp: The Intern Economy and the Culture Trust, Baffler, Spring 1997, at 
51, 51–58 (discussing increased popularity of unpaid internships and resultant restructuring of the labor 
market).
4. See Perlin, supra note 1, at xvii (“[I]llegal internships are f lourishing as never before thanks to the 
Great Recession. In a time of chronic high unemployment, internships are replacing untold numbers of 
full-time jobs: anecdotal evidence abounds of managers eliminating staff and using unpaid interns 
instead, and of organizations replacing paid internships with unpaid ones.”).
5. See Raphael Pope-Sussman, Unpaid Internships Should Be Illegal, N.Y. Times: Room for Debate (Feb. 
7, 2012, 10:43 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/02/04/do-unpaid-internships-
exploit-college-students/unpaid-internships-should-be-illegal (“This week, thousands of young people 
will work 40 hours (or more) answering phones, making coffee or doing data entry—without earning a 
cent. These unpaid interns receive no benefits, no legal protection against harassment or discrimination, 
and no job security. They generate an enormous amount of value for their employers, and yet they are 
paid nothing. That is the definition of exploitation.”).
6. For analyses concerning the legality of unpaid internships and the issue of conflicting interpretations of 
the applicable statute, see generally Paul Budd, Comment, All Work and No Pay: Establishing the Standard 
for When Legal, Unpaid Internships Become Illegal, Unpaid Labor, 63 U. Kan. L. Rev. 451 (2015); Madiha 
M. Malik, Note, The Legal Void of Unpaid Internships: Navigating the Legality of Internships in the Face of 
Conflicting Tests Interpreting the FLSA, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 1183 (2015); Kimberlee McTorry, Note, Death 
of Unpaid Internships, the Rise of Social Equality: Legality of Unpaid Internships Under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 8 S.J. Pol’y & Just. L.J. 47 (2014).
7. See Stephen Suen & Kara Brandeisky, Tracking Intern Lawsuits, ProPublica (Apr. 15, 2014), https://
projects.propublica.org/graphics/intern-suits. The FLSA grants employees a private right of action. 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
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Labor (DOL), through its enforcement of the FLSA, has actively sought to dispel 
the inequities that occur when employers substitute unpaid interns for employees.8
 Despite efforts by the DOL and unpaid interns who bring claims to combat 
workplace exploitation, recent holdings that promote a highly employer-friendly 
“primary beneficiary test”9 create dangerous and harmful precedent.10 The holding 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight 
Pictures, Inc.11 contributes to this problem, and will ease employers’ ability to 
manipulate the labor market and exploit unpaid interns.12
 In Glatt, unpaid interns at Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. (“Fox Searchlight”)—
Eric Glatt, Alexander Footman, and Eden Antalik—sued Fox Searchlight for 
compensation as “employees” under the FLSA.13 The Second Circuit vacated the 
district court’s holding that Glatt, Footman, and Antalik were entitled to 
compensation for their work at Fox Searchlight.14 This case comment contends that 
the decision by the Second Circuit in Glatt was incorrect for three reasons. First, in 
adopting the primary beneficiary test, the court unduly expanded the “trainee” 
exception that was laid out in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court opinion of Walling 
v. Portland Terminal Co.15 Second, the court neglected to defer to the DOL, the 
agency charged with administering the statute.16 Third, the court arbitrarily required 
8. See Stephen A. Mazurak, The Unpaid Intern: Liability for the Uninformed Employer, 29 A.B.A. J. Lab. & 
Emp. L. 101, 101–02 (2013).
9. For this standard defined, see Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 535 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(“Under this standard, an employment relationship is not created when the tangible and intangible 
benefits provided to the intern are greater than the intern’s contribution to the employer’s operation.”).
10. Id. at 536; Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2015); Solis v. 
Laurelbrook Sanitarium & Sch., Inc., 642 F.3d 518, 529 (6th Cir. 2011).
11. 811 F.3d at 538.
12. See discussion infra p. 171–72.
13. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 531–32. Glatt and Footman sued Fox Searchlight in September 2011—Antalik joined 
the suit at the district court level. See Steven Greenhouse, Interns, Unpaid by a Studio, File Suit, N.Y. 
Times (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/business/interns-file-suit-against-black-
swan-producer.html. Thus, Glatt and Footman sued Fox Searchlight at the beginning of a wave of 
unpaid intern litigations. See Suen & Brandeisky, supra note 7.
14. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 531–32. The unpaid interns also brought claims for compensation as employees under 
the New York Labor Law (NYLL). Id. at 531. However, the court construed the NYLL and FLSA’s 
definitions of “employee” as the same in substance because both statutes define “employee” in nearly 
identical terms. Id. at 534. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘employee’ means any 
individual employed by an employer.”), and id. § 203(g) (“‘Employ’ includes to suffer or permit to 
work.”), with N.Y Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 142-2.14(a) (2015) (“Employee means any 
individual employed, suffered or permitted to work by an employer . . . .”). Because the scope of this case 
comment is limited to the employment claims under the FLSA, this case comment does not discuss 
claims made under the NYLL.
15. 330 U.S. 148 (1947) (holding that trainees not bound to employment at the end of their training period 
were not employees under the FLSA).
16. See Major Laws Administered/Enforced, U.S. Dep’t Lab., http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/statutes/
summary.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2016).
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an individualized pre-discovery factual inquiry for class certification,17 a heightened 
standard that has no basis in precedent. Consequently, the court created precedent 
that will give employers greater latitude to manipulate the labor market and to exploit 
unpaid interns who then will struggle to bring claims as a collective action.
 Plaintiffs Glatt, Footman, and Antalik interned without pay for defendants Fox 
Searchlight and Fox Entertainment Group.18 Glatt and Footman worked on the Fox 
Searchlight-distributed film Black Swan, and Antalik worked at the Fox corporate 
offices in New York City.19 Glatt, Footman, and Antalik all performed work akin to 
that of a secretary or custodian.20
 Glatt interned from December 2, 2009, through the end of February 2010, under 
the supervision of a production accountant in the Fox Searchlight accounting 
department, from approximately nine o’clock in the morning to seven o’clock in the 
evening, five days a week.21 His responsibilities included: copying, scanning, 
maintaining files, tracking purchase orders, transporting paperwork items to and 
from the set, and answering questions about the accounting department.22 
Additionally, from March to August 2010, Glatt interned in the post-production 
department two days a week, from approximately eleven o’clock in the morning until 
six or seven o’clock in the evening, again under supervision and had responsibilities 
similar to those in the previous position.23
 Footman interned from September 29, 2009, through late February or early March 
2010, in the production department where he worked ten-hour days, five days a week, 
under the supervision of the production office coordinator and assistant production 
office coordinator.24 Footman performed responsibilities such as setting up office 
furniture, arranging lodging for cast and crew, taking lunch orders, taking out the 
garbage, drafting daily call sheets, answering the phone, making coffee, photocopying, 
accepting deliveries, admitting guests to the office, conducting Internet research, 
compiling lists of local vendors, and sending party invitations.25 Beginning in 
November 2009, when he was replaced with another unpaid intern in the production 
department, Footman’s work schedule was reduced to three days a week.26
17. See infra note 110 and text accompanying notes 96–106.
18. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 531–32.
19. Id. at 532–33.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 532.
22. Id.
23. Glatt’s responsibilities in the post-production department included: drafting cover letters for mailings, 
organizing file cabinets, filing paperwork, making photocopies, keeping the take-out menus up-to-date 
and organized, taking documents to the payroll company, and running errands. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
163
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 61 | 2016/17
 Antalik worked from May 2009 until mid-August 2009 as an unpaid publicity 
intern in Fox Searchlight’s New York corporate office.27 Antalik assembled daily 
briefs that summarized mentions of various Fox Searchlight films in the media.28 
She also made travel arrangements, shipped documents, organized catering, and set 
up rooms for press events.29
 On October 19, 2012, Glatt, Footman, and Antalik filed a class certification 
complaint30 seeking unpaid minimum wages and overtime for themselves and all 
others similarly situated on Black Swan and at Fox’s New York corporate offices.31 
After discovery, Glatt and Footman moved for partial summary judgment and 
contended that they were “employees” under the FLSA.32 Fox Searchlight and Fox 
Entertainment Group cross-moved for summary judgment and argued that Glatt 
and Footman were not “employees” under the statute.33
 On June 11, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
granted Glatt and Footman’s partial motion for summary judgment and found that 
both were improperly classified as unpaid interns rather than employees.34 In its 
analysis, the district court used the DOL’s 2010 Intern Fact Sheet publication, 
created by the Wage and Hour Division of the DOL for unpaid interns working in 
the for-profit private sector.35
 The Intern Fact Sheet contains the DOL’s six-factor test for determining whether 
an employment relationship exists. The test provides that an employment relationship 
does not exist if all the following factors apply36: (1) the internship is similar to 
training that would be given in an educational environment; (2) the internship is for 
the benefit of the intern; (3) the intern does not displace regular employees; (4) the 
employer that provides training derives no immediate advantage from the intern’s 
27. Id. at 532–33.
28. Id. at 533.
29. Id.
30. The interns in Glatt brought claims under the NYLL and FLSA but this case comment considers class 
certification only under the FLSA, which permits employees to opt-in to the action if they are “similarly 
situated” to the employees who bring the claim. Id. at 540 (explaining the concept of class certification 
and its requirements under the FLSA).
31. Id. at 533.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 538; see Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet #71: Internship Programs 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (2010) [hereinafter Fact Sheet #71], https://www.dol.gov/
whd/regs/compliance/whdfs71.pdf (providing “general information to help determine whether interns 
must be paid the minimum wage and overtime under the [FLSA] for the services that they provide to 
‘for-profit’ private sector employers”).
36. While the DOL requires that all six factors be met for an employee to be deemed an intern, the district 
court took a f lexible approach and balanced these factors, finding that four out of the six factors weighed 
in favor of an employment relationship and thus deeming Glatt and Footman to be paid employees 
under the FLSA. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 535.
164
GLATT v. FOX SEARCHLIGHT PICTURES, INC.
work, and at times the employer’s work is actually impeded; (5) the intern is not 
necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the internship; and (6) there is a 
mutual understanding that the intern is not entitled to wages.37 The district court 
used these six factors in its analysis because it gave deference to the DOL as the 
agency charged with administering the FLSA and because the factors find support 
in Portland Terminal.38
 The district court also granted Antalik’s motion to conditionally certify the 
nationwide FLSA collective.39 The district court found that conditional certification 
under the FLSA was warranted because Antalik put forth generalized proof that 
interns were victims of a common policy to replace paid workers with unpaid 
interns.40 It reasoned that common issues of liability predominated over disparate 
factual settings that pertained to each individual plaintiff.41 Further, the district 
court found persuasive that fairness and procedural considerations made the collective 
action a superior mechanism for the FLSA claims.42
 On September 17, 2013, the district court certified its order for immediate appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the statute that governs interlocutory appeals.43 On 
November 26, 2013, the Second Circuit granted defendants’ petition for leave to file 
an interlocutory appeal.44 The Second Circuit stated that the interlocutory appeal 
raised a broad question: What circumstances require unpaid interns to be deemed 
“employee[s]” under the FLSA and therefore compensated for their work?45
 The Second Circuit concluded that the district court did not apply the correct 
standard and, therefore, erred when it held that Glatt and Footman had been 
improperly classified as unpaid interns.46 As for class certification, the Second Circuit 
vacated the district court’s order certifying the nationwide FLSA collective and held 
that the standard for class certification should comport with the primary beneficiary 
37. Id. at 534–35; Fact Sheet #71, supra note 35.
38. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 531–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 811 F.3d 528.
39. Id. at 522. Conditional certification is the initial stage of certification under the FLSA, in which the court 
has discretion to issue notice of the action to potential opt-in plaintiffs and to decide whether the action 
should proceed as a collective action. See Sam J. Smith & Christine M. Jalbert, Certification—
216(b) Collective Actions v. Rule 23 Class Actions & Enterprise Coverage Under the FLSA 
3 (2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2011/
ac2011/084.authcheckdam.pdf.
40. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 538.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 535, 538 (“A class action serves judicial economy and makes recovery economically feasible for 
class members who would otherwise need to retain lawyers for individual actions seeking relatively 
small recoveries.” Id. at 535).
43. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 533. Interlocutory actions are taken by courts to seek an answer from an appellate 
court on a question of law before a trial may proceed or to prevent irreparable harm from occurring to a 
person or property during the pendency of a lawsuit or proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012).
44. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 533.
45. Id.
46. See id. at 538.
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test, which requires individualized factual inquiries as opposed to generalized proof, 
which the district court deemed adequate.47
 The Second Circuit stated that an analysis pursuant to the primary beneficiary 
test should consider the extent to which: (1) the intern and employer clearly 
understand there is no expectation of compensation; (2) the internship provides 
training similar to what would be given in an educational environment; (3) the 
internship is tied to the intern’s formal education program; (4) the internship 
accommodates the intern’s academic commitments by corresponding to the academic 
calendar; (5) the internship’s duration is limited to the period in which it provides the 
intern with beneficial learning; (6) the intern’s work complements the work of paid 
employees while providing significant educational benefits to the intern; and (7) the 
intern and employer understand that the internship is conducted without entitlement 
to a paid job at the conclusion of the internship.48
 The Second Circuit’s holdings on the issues of class certification and plaintiff 
compensation under the FLSA were both based on the primary beneficiary test.49 
Therefore, the bulk of the opinion centered on specifying why the use of the DOL’s 
factors was unpersuasive, given that undermining the DOL’s list strengthened the 
apparent need to promote a different standard.50
 The court preferred the primary beneficiary test for its f lexibility and it presumed 
f lexibility would lead courts to accurately consider the economic reality between 
intern and employer.51 Referring to the reasoning advanced in Portland Terminal, the 
court noted that the primary beneficiary test has a similar focus: it emphasizes what 
interns receive in exchange for their work.52 Despite the court’s adherence to that 
aspect of Portland Terminal ’s reasoning, it stressed that the relevant facts in that 
nearly seventy-year-old case about brakemen trainees were unrelated to the modern 
post-secondary education-oriented internship.53
 Accordingly, the Second Circuit found that the DOL’s six-factor test, which the 
district court favored and which stemmed from the DOL’s interpretation of Portland 
Terminal, was unpersuasive.54 The court presumed that adherence to the Portland 
Terminal facts on which the DOL’s six-factor test is based does not afford the 
f lexibility required in light of the modern-day internship, which did not exist when 
47. Id. at 538–40.
48. Id. at 536–37.
49. Id. at 535–40.
50. Id. at 536–38.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 536. The court further emphasized that the more f lexible approach is favorable to the Portland 
Terminal holding, given that the court found nothing in that decision to suggest that any particular fact 
was essential to its conclusion or that the facts relied on in that case would have the same relevance in 
every workplace. Id. at 537.
53. Id. at 537–38.
54. Id. at 536–38.
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Portland Terminal was decided.55 As for deference to the DOL, the court pointed out 
that the DOL is an agency and therefore “has no special competence or role in 
interpreting a judicial decision.”56 The Second Circuit concluded that it would not 
defer to the DOL57 or to the district court that limited its review to the six factors in 
the DOL’s Intern Fact Sheet.58
 This case comment contends that the decision by the Second Circuit was 
incorrect for three reasons. First, by adopting the primary beneficiary test, it unduly 
expanded the “trainee” exception that the Supreme Court laid out in Portland 
Terminal.59 Second, it neglected to defer to the agency charged with administering 
the statute.60 Third, its arbitrary requirement for an individualized inquiry into facts 
pertaining to each plaintiff regarding pre-discovery class certification under the 
FLSA has no basis in precedent. The holding by the Second Circuit thus created 
precedent that will give employers greater latitude to manipulate the labor market 
and exploit unpaid interns who, in turn, will be hard-pressed to bring collective 
action claims.
 First, by adopting the primary beneficiary test, the Second Circuit erred by 
unduly expanding the “trainee” exception that the Supreme Court laid out in Portland 
Terminal.61 The Supreme Court has emphasized the breadth of the FLSA’s definition 
of “employee,”62 stating that there is “no doubt as to the Congressional intention to 
include all employees within the scope of the [FLSA] unless specifically excluded.”63 
Accordingly, the Portland Terminal Court acknowledged limited circumstances when 
self-interest serving work is not within the FLSA’s definition of “employee.”64
 The Portland Terminal Court formulated a “trainee” exception on the basis of facts 
it deemed pertinent to distinguish those whose work is self-interest serving.65 The case 
involved prospective brakemen enrolled in a weeklong training program offered by the 
railroad.66 The program was a prerequisite for employment but employment was not 
55. Id. at 537–38.
56. Id. at 536 (quoting New York v. Shalala, 119 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1997)).
57. The court emphasized that the DOL’s interpretation is at most entitled to Skidmore deference to the 
extent that the court finds it persuasive. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) 
(“The weight of [the Administrator’s] judgment . . . will depend upon . . . all those factors which give it 
power to persuade . . . .”)).
58. Id. at 538.
59. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 151–53 (1947).
60. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536; see Major Laws Administered/Enforced, supra note 16.
61. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 151–53.
62. See supra note 14.
63. United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 363 (1945).
64. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 152–53.
65. Id. at 151–53.
66. Id. at 149.
167
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 61 | 2016/17
guaranteed once the program ended.67 Those who enrolled and participated neither 
expected nor received compensation for the program’s duration.68 Prospective brakemen 
learned about their responsibilities first through “observation” and then by performing 
tasks under “close scrutiny.”69 That they were closely supervised indicated to the court 
that the prospective brakemen had not displaced regular employees.70 Further, their 
work did not expedite the railroad’s business, and, in fact, impeded it because regular 
employees had to monitor the trainees while still performing other duties.71
 The DOL took its factors directly from facts the Portland Terminal Court deemed 
pertinent.72 Its test is faithful to Portland Terminal, both in maintaining the narrow 
exception to the FLSA and in applying the factors that the Portland Terminal Court 
used.73 Because the primary beneficiary test lacks the requirement that all six factors 
must be met, it effectively broadens the “trainee” exception.74 Additionally, the 
primary beneficiary test replaces an objective standard—the six-factor test—with 
one that is subjective, which consequently broadens the exception further by 
increasing judicial discretion.75
 Second, the Glatt court erred by not deferring to the agency charged with 
administering the statute.76 The Intern Fact Sheet was issued as an interpretive 
guideline to clarify minimum wage requirements under the FLSA for unpaid 
internships.77 Guidelines even in the form of bulletins and opinions that interpret the 
FLSA have been recognized as an important function of the DOL.78 But the extent 
67. Id. at 150.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 149.
70. Id. at 149–50.
71. Id. at 150.
72. Compare supra text and accompanying note 37, with supra text accompanying notes 67–71.
73. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. at 151–53.
74. See Iskra M. Bonanno, “Primary Beneficiary” Is the New Test for Determining Whether an Intern Is Exempt 
from the FLSA in the Second and Eleventh Circuits, HSE: Lab. & Emp. Blog (Oct. 23, 2015), http://
www.hselaw.com/blog/entry/primary-beneficiary-is-the-new-test-for-determining-whether-an-intern-
is-exempt-from-the-f lsa-in-the-second-and-eleventh-circuits (“[T]he [Second and Eleventh Circuits] 
rejected the DOL’s six-factor test as outdated and rigid. They replaced this test with a broader, non-
exhaustive list of factors that appears to be more employer-friendly.”). The district court in Glatt even 
erred on the side of increased f lexibility by requiring a balancing of the six factors, as opposed to 
mandating that all six factors be met, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 532 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016), but the Second Circuit’s holding was premised in 
part on providing even more f lexibility than was provided by the district court, and thus expanded the 
exception to an unacceptable extent. See Glatt, 811 F.3d at 538.
75. See Morse v. Rudler (In re Rudler), 576 F.3d 37, 50–51 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that use of an objective 
standard is a means by which Congress limits judicial discretion); Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 532 (stating that 
the “‘primary beneficiary’ test is subjective and unpredictable”).
76. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536.
77. See Malik, supra note 6, at 1195.
78. Christopher Keleher, The Perils of Unpaid Internships, 101 Ill. B.J. 626, 628 (2013).
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of deference to which guidelines are entitled is highly contended.79 For example, 
Justice Antonin Scalia stated in Christensen v. Harris County that agency guidelines 
interpreting the FLSA are entitled to Chevron deference—the highest level of 
deference—when the interpretation represents the views of the agency.80 Nonetheless, 
the Christensen Court held that agency interpretations that lack the “force of law” are 
entitled to deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.81
 The “force of law” test as applied in Christensen was abandoned by the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Mead Corp.82 The Mead Court used a modified analysis, 
stating that Chevron deference will apply to an informal agency determination if “it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules 
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”83 The outcome of the Mead decision is 
that procedure is not determinative.84 The subsequent Supreme Court decision 
Barnhart v. Walton followed suit by setting forth factors to consider in a totality of 
the circumstances approach used to determine whether Chevron deference applies, 
regardless of procedure.85 The Barnhart factors are as follows: (1) the interstitial 
nature of the legal issue; (2) the related expertise of the agency; (3) the importance of 
the question to the administration of the statute; (4) the complexity of that 
administration; and (5) the consideration the agency has given the question over a 
long period.86
 In Glatt, the Second Circuit neglected to even consider the Barnhart factors, and 
instead presumed that only Skidmore deference should apply to the DOL’s six-factor 
test.87 This exhibited a neglect of Supreme Court precedent that disfavors the view that 
79. See id.
80. 529 U.S. 576, 590 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[W]e have 
accorded Chevron deference not only to agency regulations, but to authoritative agency positions set 
forth in a variety of other formats.” (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999); 
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57 (1995); Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647–48 (1990))).
81. Id. at 587 (majority opinion). While Chevron deference is the highest level of deference, and the settled 
rule is that any interpretation accorded Chevron deference courts should defer to if reasonable, Skidmore 
deference is a lower level of deference, whereby courts should only defer to the agency’s interpretation to 
the extent that the court deems the interpretation persuasive. See Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: 
Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1105, 1129–47 
(2001).
82. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
83. Id. at 226–27.
84. Id. at 230–31 (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the want of 
that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference 
even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.”).
85. 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
86. Id.
87. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536 (2d Cir. 2016).
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procedure determines whether an agency action should be given deference.88 Thus, the 
form of an opinion letter is not valid ground to mandate that Chevron deference is 
inapplicable. By finding the contrary, the Second Circuit erred.
 The Second Circuit further erred when it concluded that it would not defer to the 
DOL in light of Skidmore precedent.89 In Skidmore, the Supreme Court held that an 
agency’s interpretation may warrant deference because of the “specialized experience 
and broader investigations and information” available to the agency and given the value 
in uniform administration of a statute.90 The DOL’s interpretive guidelines that set out 
the six-factor test “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment” courts 
should resort to for guidance.91 If the DOL’s six-factor test is entitled to Skidmore 
deference, a court must measure that deference as proportional to the “thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.”92
 The Second Circuit stated that it would not defer to the DOL’s six-factor test 
because it was outdated in light of the modern-day internship, reasoning that the 
f lexibility of the primary beneficiary test allows courts to consider changes in 
economic structure.93 However, that f lexibility necessitates judicial discretion and 
subjective inquiries that unduly expand the carefully limited exception created in 
Portland Terminal.94 The agency’s informed decision to base its test on the credible 
analysis in Portland Terminal affords the test deference.
 That the DOL’s six-factor test is relevant to the modern economy weakens the 
Second Circuit’s argument that the test fails to consider the modern-day internship. 
Even the list of considerations set out by the Second Circuit highlights the same 
essential criteria.95 But the DOL’s mechanism is a superior application of these 
criteria. Therefore, the Second Circuit should have deferred to the DOL’s list because 
its persuasiveness affords it deference under Skidmore precedent.
 Third, the Second Circuit arbitrarily required an individualized factual inquiry 
in pre-discovery class certification, a heightened standard that has no basis in 
precedent. Class certification under the FLSA requires that class members be 
“similarly situated.”96 The FLSA provides no definition to make that determination.97 
88. See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
89. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536.
90. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944).
91. Id. at 140.
92. Id.
93. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 537–38.
94. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 151–53 (1947).
95. See supra text accompanying note 48.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012).
97. See O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 584 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The [FLSA] does not 
define ‘similarly situated.’”), overruled on other grounds by Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 
663 (2016).
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Therefore, the determination is based on precedent.98 The Second Circuit follows 
the two-step process for certifying collective actions under the FLSA.99 The initial 
step permits the district court to give notice to potential opt-in plaintiffs who may be 
“similarly situated” to the named plaintiffs with respect to the FLSA requirement.100 
The district court may send notice after “plaintiffs make a modest factual showing 
that they and [potential opt-in plaintiffs] together were victims of a common policy 
or plan that violated the law.”101 Thus, generalized proof ought to be sufficient, as the 
district court held.102 Accordingly, the Second Circuit has stated that plaintiffs can 
meet the requirements by a showing that they and other potential opt-in plaintiffs 
are “similarly situated with respect to their job requirements and with regard to their 
pay provisions.”103
 The second step permits the district court to determine whether the collective 
action may proceed by determining whether the opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated 
to the named plaintiffs.104 This is the post-discovery stage, where the lenient standard 
at the initial step is raised to a preponderance of the evidence standard owing to the 
benefit of “additional factual development.”105 However, courts weigh the fairness 
and procedural considerations inherent in a collective action, which “serves judicial 
economy and makes recovery economically feasible for class members who would 
otherwise need to retain lawyers for individual actions.”106
 The district court correctly applied the two-step process and found that a general 
policy existed whereby Fox would replace paid workers with unpaid interns.107 It 
therefore approved the class action.108 The district court considered the fairness and 
procedural advantages and held that common issues of liability predominated over 
disparate factual settings.109 In contrast, the Second Circuit noted the precedent on 
which the district court based its holding, but required individual factual inquiries at 
98. See Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing ways courts 
interpret the similarly situated requirement).
99. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 539–40 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Myers v. Hertz 
Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 554–55 (2d Cir. 2010) (endorsing the two-step class certification process)).
100. Id. at 540.
101. Id. 
102. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 516, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated, 811 F.3d 528.
103. Myers, 624 F.3d at 555 (quoting Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1259 (11th Cir. 
2008)).
104. Glatt, 811 F.3d at 540.
105. Id.; see Myers, 624 F.3d at 547–48.
106. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 535.
107. Id. at 538.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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both steps per the court’s application of the primary beneficiary test.110 The holding 
disregarded fairness and procedural considerations that persuaded the district court 
to favor a collective action.111 Further, it neglected widely acknowledged problems 
associated with individualized factual requirements before discovery.112
 Glatt, Footman, and Antalik at the very least were, in accordance with the 
district court’s conclusion and Second Circuit precedent, “similarly situated with 
respect to their job requirements and with regard to their pay provisions.”113 Each 
performed tasks akin to that of a secretary or custodian and the tasks performed 
were, for the most part, menial. Nonetheless, they were essential tasks that would 
have been completed regardless of the presence of unpaid interns at Fox.114 Because 
tasks like taking out the trash, answering the phone, making deliveries, assembling 
briefs, and maintaining files are menial but essential in the daily course of business, 
had it not been for the availability of unpaid interns, paid employees would have 
performed those tasks in addition to their own job requirements. The district court 
noted these circumstances as not just extending to Glatt, Footman, and Antalik, but 
to all those who opted-in to the class action.115
 The injustice inherent in this situation is substantially more difficult to address 
under the Glatt court’s new standard. Plaintiffs must overcome the hurdle of 
demonstrating factual similarities among varying numbers of potential opt-ins 
110. The Second Circuit in Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376, 388 (2d Cir. 2015), superseded by 
811 F.3d 528, held that class certification required a highly individualized inquiry. This requirement was 
applied without regard to the two-step process. Id. (“Under the primary beneficiary test we have set forth, 
courts must consider individual aspects of the intern’s experience.”). While the specific language from that 
requirement was omitted from the superseding opinion, and any variation of the word “individual” 
regarding class certification was either omitted or replaced with the phrase “context-specific,” the 
substance of this revision has not changed. The “context-specific” inquiry will require individualized 
factual inquiries nonetheless because the requirement that class certification must be analyzed pursuant to 
the primary beneficiary test necessitates adherence to the factors that the Second Circuit laid out in its 
opinion, which require individualized inquiries. See supra text accompanying note 48. Thus, the seventeen 
cases, twenty trial court documents, four appellate court documents, and twenty-six scholarly sources that 
cited (and interpreted) the Second Circuit’s initial opinion in Glatt, let alone any unpublished or unwritten 
interpretations over the nearly seven months between the time the initial opinion was decided and the date 
of the superseding opinion, will not have any cause to change those interpretations. See Citing References 
of Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., WestlawNext, http://next.westlaw.com (sign in; search in search 
bar for “Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 791 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2015)”; then select “Citing 
References”) (last visited Oct. 21, 2016). This is despite the omission of the word “individualized,” seeing 
as the essential criteria that are the bases of the primary beneficiary analysis are the same in both opinions, 
and those criteria are the key to the heightened standard.
111. Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 538–39.
112. See Thompson v. Fathom Creative, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Pre-discovery summary 
judgment motions are usually premature and hence disfavored.” (quoting Bourbeau v. Jonathan Woodner 
Co., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2009))); Venables v. Sagona, 848 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (2nd Dep’t 2007) 
(holding that limited facts in a pre-discovery record warrant denial of motions to dismiss as premature).
113. Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
114. The district court made this argument when it stated, in reference to the plaintiff interns, “[m]enial as it 
was, their work was essential.” Glatt, 293 F.R.D. at 533.
115. Id. at 538.
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without the benefit of factual development that occurs in discovery. Without time 
necessary for factual development—a fundamental purpose of discovery—plaintiffs 
will be burdened to produce sufficient evidence that will demonstrate factual 
similarities necessary to plead a claim.
 The Glatt court’s holding, in light of these errors, hurts interns and employees 
alike. Policies that replace paid employees with unpaid interns will less likely 
constitute grounds for class certification under the FLSA. Unpaid interns with little-
to-no bargaining power will thus more likely be required to pursue individual actions 
to combat unfair labor practices. And the decreased specificity inherent in the 
deviation from the DOL’s bright-line rule will enable employers to “exploit unpaid 
interns by using their free labor without providing them with an appreciable benefit 
in education or experience.”116 The holding by the Second Circuit in Glatt indicates 
ignorance of that reality.
 In conclusion, the Glatt court’s endorsement of the primary beneficiary test not 
only broadens the Portland Terminal “trainee” exception but also makes class 
certification under the FLSA virtually impossible for unpaid interns. Therefore, 
opportunities for unpaid interns to bring claims seeking compensation under the 
FLSA will significantly decrease. Employers will have greater f lexibility to 
manipulate the labor market while aggrieved interns will be forced to cope with 
increased difficulty in finding legal redress.
116. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 535 (2d Cir. 2016).
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